For years, major French clubs have tried to remain competitive against an increasingly wealthy Premier League and European giants with vast revenues.
But in 2026, economic reality is catching up with part of Ligue 1.
Olympique de Marseille and Olympique Lyonnais are the most visible examples of this. Two historic clubs, two different models, but the same necessity: cutting costs and restoring financial balance.
And behind them, a large part of the French football business model is now being called into question.
📺 The number one problem: the collapse of TV revenues.
To understand the situation, one must start with a figure.
For the 2026–2027 season, French football is expected to generate approximately €412 million in gross broadcasting revenue.
However, after the various deductions, charges, and solidarity mechanisms, only around **€184 million is ultimately expected to be distributed to the 18 Ligue 1 clubs**.
The comparison with the rest of Europe is stark.
The Premier League benefits from a domestic contract worth approximately £6.75 billion over four seasons, or around £1.7 billion per season.
French clubs must therefore face the same competitors in the player market with incomparably lower broadcasting revenues.
And when a club builds its budget by anticipating European revenues or major player sales, the risk becomes considerable.
🔵⚪ OM: over €100m in losses
The case of Marseille is particularly revealing.
The accounts closed on June 30, 2025, show a net loss of **€104.8 million**, an unprecedented figure for OM.
Income excluding transfers had fallen by 34%, notably due to the absence of European competition.
At the same time, the total wage bill, including social security contributions, amounted to approximately €153.7 million.
In other words, OM had built a cost structure requiring very substantial revenue to break even.
Europe—and the Champions League in particular—was no longer merely a sporting objective.
It was becoming an economic necessity.
This dependence is dangerous because European qualification remains, by definition, uncertain.
UEFA and the DNCG eventually stepped in.
The situation is no longer merely theoretical.
UEFA has confirmed that Marseille failed to meet the final target of its financial agreement for the 2025–2026 season, particularly regarding the rule concerning football-related results. The European governing body also highlights the exceptional collapse of French broadcasting revenues.
In France, the DNCG has decided to cap OM’s wage bill for the 2026–2027 season.
This partly explains the austerity measures seen in Marseille.
And it can be frustrating from a sporting perspective while being financially necessary.
🔴🔵 Lyon: an even deeper problem
In Lyon, the situation is different.
OL has drastically cut its spending but still has to absorb the financial legacy of previous years.
As of December 31, 2025, Eagle Football Group reported:
€616.3 million in financial debt, compared with €517.9 million six months earlier.
Shareholders' equity was negative at −€347.9 million.
The net result for the first half of the year stood at −€186.5 million, although a significant portion stemmed from receivable write-downs linked to the former Eagle Football structure.
These figures are impressive.
But they tell only part of the story.
Lyon has already begun its turnaround.
There has been a dramatic improvement in the club's day-to-day operations.
EBITDA went from:
−46,1 M€ → −2,2 M€
in just one year.
The six-monthly wage bill also went from approximately:
99,2 M€ → 60,4 M€
or a reduction close to 40 %.
OL is therefore showing something interesting:
A club can still be extremely financially fragile while having already corrected a large part of its business model.
The problem for Lyon now lies primarily in the weight of the past.
Three years to rebuild OL
And we now have an indication of the duration of the recovery.
Michael Gerlinger, the Managing Director of OL, explained on September 7 that it would take at least three years to restructure the club.
He also revealed that Lyon had once again sold players worth nearly €70 million this summer, following sales of around €100 million the previous year.
And he makes no secret of the fact that OL will likely have to continue selling.
Failure to qualify for the Champions League against Fenerbahçe also resulted in an estimated revenue loss of around €30 million.
Once again, we encounter the same issue:
A sporting result immediately alters the financial equation.
📊 French football has become a selling market.
This is probably the most important consequence.
When recurring revenues decline, players become a source of funding.
Training or buying a young player, developing them, and then reselling them at a profit is becoming almost essential.
The transfer market is then no longer merely a tool for building a team.
It becomes a source of income.
This explains why French clubs can sell a huge number of players while sometimes appearing to weaken in sporting terms.
And that is where a potentially dangerous cycle is created.
Lower revenue → player sales → weakened squads → tougher European results → lower revenue → further sales.
⚠️ But selling isn’t necessarily bad.
Nevertheless, one must avoid drawing an overly simple conclusion.
Reducing the wage bill or selling a player is not necessarily a sign of poor management.
It can even be exactly the opposite.
If a club consistently spends more than it earns, continuing to invest simply to maintain its sporting ambitions merely postpones the problem.
Lyon is beginning to demonstrate that a very significant reduction in costs can bring operational activity close to the break-even point.
Marseille is now also attempting to reduce its financial exposure.
The real challenge, therefore, lies in finding the balance between austerity and competitiveness.
🎯 The Champions League: a probability turned into guaranteed revenue.
This is probably the point that interests us most at FootProbability.
A club can hope to qualify for the Champions League.
He can build a squad capable of achieving that.
He may even have a **70% chance** of achieving his goal.
But 70% is never 100%.
However, wages and financial obligations will have to be paid, come what may.
Building a budget that requires European qualification therefore amounts to transforming probabilistic income into a certain expense.
And when the adverse scenario plays out, the business model immediately becomes fragile.
OL has just experienced this firsthand: its elimination in the Champions League play-offs reportedly cost it around €30 million in potential revenue.
Our FootProbability analysis
French football does not necessarily lack big clubs, supporters, or talent.
What is primarily lacking today is sufficiently substantial and predictable recurring revenue to sustain the spending levels to which certain clubs had become accustomed.
OM needs to cut back on its spending.
Lyon must rectify several years of imbalances while continuing to sell.
Other clubs, including Monaco, also have their wage bills subject to DNCG oversight.
The current period could therefore mark a profound shift in the French model:
Buy less, recruit better, train more, and sell at the right time.
It is painful in the short term.
But this can also produce financially much stronger clubs.
For ultimately, there is a common rule shared by sports betting and club management:
One can take a risk based on a probability. One should never build one's financial survival as if that probability were a certainty.